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In the postal sector, the net cost of universal service depends on the content of the service, the 
postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration.  These three groups of 
factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the 
market.  In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we 
show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the cost of universal service between 
market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, 
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In  the  European  Union,  Full  Market  Opening  (FMO)  of  postal  markets  is  now 
scheduled for 2011.  FMO allows competitors of the incumbent postal operator to 
enter all the segments of the postal markets including mail delivery.  At the same 
time,  high  standards  for  the  universal  service  (daily  collection  and  delivery, 
nationwide  coverage,  affordable  tariffs)  are  maintained.    In  a  liberalized  postal 













cost  of  universal  service  depends  on  three  groups  of  factors:  the  definition  of 
universal  service  (and,  incidentally,  its  measurement),  the  postal  market 
characteristics  and  the  country’s  geographical  configuration.    Universal  postal 
service is usually defined along three lines: the scope of products, the quality in its 
multiple  aspects  and  the  price  constraints  on  universal  service  products.    The 
precise  content  of  these  obligations  differs  substantially  across  countries 
(Ambrosini et al., 2006) and the cost of complying with the obligations depends on 











Gautier  (2008)  show  that  the  efficiency  of  the  USP  determines  the  mode  of 
competition (access or bypass) adopted by incoming postal operators.  d’Alcantara 
and  Gautier  (2008)  show  that  the  countries’  geographical  characteristics  have  a 
major impact on the entrant’s scale of operations and on the profits of the historical 
operator.   Thus the ability of the USP to finance the universal postal service in a 
liberalized  environment  depends  on  the  definition  of  USO,  the  market,  and  the  


















on  non‐covered  routes  (Pay‐or‐play).    These  USO  funding  mechanisms  are  not 
‘competitively neutral’: they affect the way firms compete on the market.  With a USO 
funding  mechanism,  competitors’  behavior  might  be  modified  in  three  different 
ways.  The fund can induce (1) a change in the entrant’s market behavior (2) a 




mechanism,  the  operating  scale  of  the  competitors  may  change.    Some  routes, 
services or products that were profitable before the imposition of a compensation 













hypothetical  countries  with  heterogeneous  geographical  characteristics  (as  in 























making  the  choice  of  an  appropriate  tax  base  sensitive.    Second,  our  numerical 
simulations  aim  at  deriving  plausible  values  for  the  different  taxes  in  the  three 
country configurations.   This is particularly interesting because a tax estimation 
based on a computation of the net cost of USO is likely to be misleading if it fails to 





















entrant,  firm  E.    As  part  of  the  USO,  the  incumbent  operator  must  deliver  mail 





































the  upstream  (collection  and  transport)  and  downstream  (sorting  and  delivery) 
activities and we decompose the total cost between these two tasks.  Because of the 
universal service, firms have a different cost structure. Panzar (1991) and De Bijl et 
al.  (2006)  among  others  argue  that,  unlike  other  network  industries,  a  postal 
delivery  network  requires  little  sunk  costs,  since  the  main  costs  are  workers, 
vehicles and buildings.  Therefore, we consider that all the long run costs of the 
entrant  are  variable.      Things  are  different  for  the  incumbent  because  of  the 
universal  service  obligations  usually  imposed.    If  the  incumbent  must  deliver 














delivery  mode  (pedestrian,  bike  or  motorized)  and  the  cost  of  delivery  for  each 
mode.    
For the entrant, there is no fixed cost in delivery.  The per‐unit downstream cost is 















presume  that  the  shape  of  the  two  functions  F(x)  and  de(x)  is  identical.    Since 
households  are  identical  except  for  their  delivery  cost,  the  entrant  who  is  not 
bounded to nationwide coverage will serve the lowest cost households first.  Let us 
denote by ne, the index of the last covered household.  The whole set of addresses 
decomposes  into  a  subset  [0,ne]  of  contested  addresses  and  a  subset  [ne,  N]  of 
insulated addresses where the historical operator remains as a monopolist.    
 
When  the  entrant  delivers  to  a  subset  ne  of  the  population,  the  profits  of  the 
incumbent and the entrant are respectively:  
€ 
Πi(pi,pe) = ne(pi −ci − di)qi









The  first  term  in  Πi  is  the  profit  made  by  the  incumbent  on  the  ne  contested 






















































































































  Entry fee  Output tax  Turnover tax  Coverage tax  Pay­or­play 
Price  =  +  +  =  = 



































from  the  entrant  can  be  used  to  sustain  the  USO.    An  entry  fee  equal  to  ‐Πi  is 












(cfr.  Table  1)  and,  thereby,  the  incumbent’s  profit  increases.    Hence,  the  total 
revenue for the incumbent (profit + tax revenue) increases with the level of the tax.  
The  regulator  must  choose  the  tax  level  that  leaves  a  zero  profit  to  the  USP.  




9  Except  for  the  pay‐or‐play  that,  incidentally,  intensifies  competition.    For  that 












costs,  two  assumptions  that  we  made  in  this  paper.    In  a  related  paper, 















































and  a  large  rural  region  (40%  of  the  country)  and  fixed  delivery  costs  are 







configurations  and  only  its  distribution  among  addresses  differs.    Thus,  the 















  Homogenous  Monotone  Dual 
Coverage  87%  78%  57% 




Last,  we  must  parameterize  the  entrant’s  cost  function.  We  assume  that  the 
entrant’s unit cost of handling a unit of mail to x is 20% lower than the average unit 





























  Homogenous  Monotone  Dual 
ne  20%  58%  50% 
pi  0.43  0.42  0.44 
pe  0.32  0.34  0.33 
Πi  ‐5.5m  ‐24.2m  ‐26.4m 




The  basic  scenario  calls  for  three  remarks.    First,  countries  that  were  identical 
before FMO (same break‐even price, same welfare) are no longer identical after 
market  opening.    In  particular,  the  market  penetration  of  the  entrant  varies 




entrant’s  profit  more  than  double  in  the  dual  case  (at  19.2m)  compared  to  the 
homogeneous  case  (at  7.9m).  And  third,  in  none  of  these  configurations  the 
incumbent is able to finance the cost of USO.  
 
Thus,  universal  service  cannot  be  sustained  without  a  subsidizing  scheme.    We 
calibrate the market outcomes with four different tax instruments: an entry fee, a 
coverage  tax,  an  output  tax  and  a  revenue  tax.    The  pay‐or‐play  option,  that 
stimulates  market  expansion  and  thus  further  deteriorates  aggregate  profits  is 
never  a  feasible  option  in  this  model.    Likewise,  the  lump‐sum  entry  fee  that 
requires positive aggregate profits is neither a feasible option in the monotone and 


















incumbent  has  thus  two  strategies;  either  it  allows  large‐scale  entry  and  the 

























Prices           




0.32  0.34  0.34  0.33  0.32 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
         
  193  189  187  187  128 (187*) 
  73  69  61  56  73 
 
 
133  133  141  145  133 
Net profits (m€)           
Πi  ‐5.5  0  0  0  28.2(0*) 
Πe 
 
7.9  7.9  8.4  8.7  7.9 
Welfare (m€) 
 
192  189  188  187  142 
(189*) 
Tax rate  /  0.02€   5%   2€   / 
Tax proceeds    1.06m  0.95m  0.8m   




















obligations.    Without  the  uniform  price  constraint,  the  incumbent  can  charge  a 
different  price  on  the  non‐contested  addresses  that  represent  80%  of  the 
population.  If it applies the monopoly price, it makes considerable profits.  And the 








In  the  monotone  configuration,  the  entrant  covers  58%  of  the  country  in  the 
unsubsidized scenario.  In this scenario, the universal service provider is making 












on  the  market  coverage.    With  a  7.95€  tax  on  each  household  covered  (or 
equivalently  a  64%  tax  on  profits),  the  entrant  delivers  only  to  29%  of  the 
addresses.  The entrant’s price is identical compared to the unsubsidized scenario 

























Prices           




0.34  0.42  0.41  0.34  0.27 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
         
  195  183  180  187  128 (173*) 
  108  104  88  64  170 
 
 
97  88  103  137  59 
Net profits (m€)           
Πi  ‐24.2  0  0  0  13.1 (0*) 
Πe 
 
12.1  9.0  8.7  4.3  2.8 
Welfare (m€) 
 
185  180  176  185  159 (189*) 
Tax rate  /  0.087€   23.6%   13.7€   / 
Tax proceeds    8.05m  9.6m  7.95m   








firms  compete  for  35%  of  the  delivery  routes,  considerably  less  than  in  the 
unsubsidized scenario, and both firms have positive profits.  The incumbent price 













entrant  has  a  smaller  operating  scale  than  in  the  monotone  case  (50%  of  the 


























Prices         




0.33  0.41  0.40  0.27 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
       
  191  178  176  128 (144*) 
  74  79  60  142 
 
 
130  110  129  82 
Net profits (106€)         
Πi  ‐26.4  0  0  1.4 (0*) 
Πe 
 
19.2  13.3  12.4  7.1 
Welfare (106€) 
 
180  176  172  163 (179*) 
Tax rate  /  0.105€   30%   / 
Tax proceeds    11.3m  16.8m   
         
* Regulated price 
Table 6: Dual country  
 Taxes  based  on  coverage  are  not  feasible  in  this  country  configuration.    Indeed 

















depends  on  the  country  configuration.    In  table  7,  we  have  ranked  the  various 
solutions for each country according to their welfare level.    
 
  Homogenous  Monotone  Dual 
Entry fee  1  n.a  n.a 
Output tax  2  2  1 
Revenue tax  3  3  2 















most  important,  only  taxes  that  distort  both  the  pricing  and  the  coverage  are 
feasible.   
                                                        




two  plausible  assumptions  for  the  postal  sector.    They  imply  that  no  market 
expansion is expected after FMO.14  Moreover, the cost structure is such that the 
incumbent has a high average cost but a low marginal cost while the entrant has a 













more  significant,  the  lump‐sum  tax  is  ineffective  and  the  tax  must  reduce  the 
competitive pressure.  The coverage tax lowers the number of challenged routes, 












The  choice  of  an  appropriate  tax  instrument  is  thus  dependent  on  the  country 













dual  country.    These  price  differences  reflect  the  use  of  more  distortive  tax 
instruments.  
 
















incumbent  is  able  to  sustain  the  USO  without  taxes  but  consumers  that  are  not 
covered by the entrant face the monopoly price.   For that reason, the non‐uniform 
price  solution  leads  to  a  considerably  lower  welfare,  unless  some  form  of  price 








only  on  the  profit‐making  services  leaving  the  unprofitable  ones  to  the  USP.    A 
universal  service  fund  can  be  used  to  re‐organize  cross‐subsidies  within  the 
industry  but  such  a  fund  modifies  the  way  firms  compete.    Universal  service  is 
financed differently in a liberalized environment and the financing mechanism is not 
competitively neutral.  Pushing this logic to its end, a reform of the universal service 
financing  should  be  accompanied  by  a  reform  in  the  definition  of  the  universal 











depends  on  the  countries’  geographical  characteristics  with  more  asymmetric 
countries  requiring  more  distortive  tax  instruments.    From  our  calibrations,  it 
appears that none of our country configurations is able to finance the universal 
service without a compensation fund.  This quite dark picture of the postal sector 
could  be  partially  explained  by  the  calibration  hypothesis  we  made.  Though  we 
believe that the parameters chosen are plausible, we made assumptions that are 
quite unfavorable to the USP.  Especially, we considered a low mail volume per 
inhabitant,  a  low  cost  elasticity  for  the  USP  and  a  large  cost  advantage  for  the 
entrant.    It  is  indeed  in  those  circumstances  that  USO  funding  will  be  the  more 
problematic,  and  even  more  if  the  country  is  asymmetric.    Whether  European 
countries  will  be  in  such  a  worst‐case  scenario  after  FMO  is  still  a  debatable 
question since competition is still at its infancy and postal markets are ahead of 
major  changes.    The  future  of  the  universal  service  and  its  financing  are  in  the 
agenda of many European countries.  In the UK for instance, the Hooper report 






























Postal  Sector:  Economics  Learnings  from  Cross‐Country  Comparisons,”  in  M.  A. 
Crew  a  P.  R.  Kleindorfer  (eds),  Progress  toward Liberalization  of  the  Postal  and 
Delivery Sector, Springer. 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